Georgia State University

ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
ICEPP Working Papers

International Center for Public Policy

2013

The Impact of Tax Incentives to Stimulate Investment in South
Africa
Estian Calitz
University of Stellenbosch, calitz@sun.ac.za

Sally Wallace
Georgia State University, swallace@gsu.edu

Le Roux Burrows
University of Stellenbosch, lrb@sun.ac.za

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/icepp
Part of the Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Calitz, Estian; Wallace, Sally; and Burrows, Le Roux, "The Impact of Tax Incentives to Stimulate Investment
in South Africa" (2013). ICEPP Working Papers. 37.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/icepp/37

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the International Center for Public Policy at
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in ICEPP Working Papers by an
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@gsu.edu.

INTERNATIONAL
CENTER FOR
PUBLIC POLICY

International Center for Public Policy
In Working Paper 13-06
April 2013

The Impact of Tax Incentives to Stimulate
Investment in South Africa
Estian Calitz
Sally Wallace
Le Roux Burrows

International Center for Public Policy
Working Paper 13-06

The Impact of Tax Incentives to Stimulate
Investment in South Africa
Estian Calitz
Sally Wallace
Le Roux Burrows
April 2013

International Center for Public Policy
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies
Georgia State University
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
United States of America
Phone: (404) 651-1144
Fax: (404) 651-4449
Email: hseraphin@gsu.edu
Internet: http://aysps.gsu.edu/isp/index.html
Copyright 2006, the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. No part
of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by
any means without prior written permission from the copyright owner.

International Center for Public Policy
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies
The Andrew Young School of Policy Studies was established at Georgia State University with
the objective of promoting excellence in the design, implementation, and evaluation of public
policy. In addition to two academic departments (economics and public administration), the
Andrew Young School houses seven leading research centers and policy programs, including
the International Center for Public Policy.
The mission of the International Center for Public Policy is to provide academic and professional
training, applied research, and technical assistance in support of sound public policy and
sustainable economic growth in developing and transitional economies.
The International Center for Public Policy at the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies is
recognized worldwide for its efforts in support of economic and public policy reforms through
technical assistance and training around the world. This reputation has been built serving a
diverse client base, including the World Bank, the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), finance ministries, government
organizations, legislative bodies and private sector institutions.
The success of the International Center for Public Policy reflects the breadth and depth of the
in-house technical expertise that the International Center for Public Policy can draw upon. The
Andrew Young School's faculty are leading experts in economics and public policy and have
authored books, published in major academic and technical journals, and have extensive
experience in designing and implementing technical assistance and training programs. Andrew
Young School faculty have been active in policy reform in over 40 countries around the world.
Our technical assistance strategy is not to merely provide technical prescriptions for policy
reform, but to engage in a collaborative effort with the host government and donor agency to
identify and analyze the issues at hand, arrive at policy solutions and implement reforms.
The International Center for Public Policy specializes in four broad policy areas:





Fiscal policy, including tax reforms, public expenditure reviews, tax administration reform
Fiscal decentralization, including fiscal decentralization reforms, design of intergovernmental
transfer systems, urban government finance
Budgeting and fiscal management, including local government budgeting, performancebased budgeting, capital budgeting, multi-year budgeting
Economic analysis and revenue forecasting, including micro-simulation, time series
forecasting,

For more information about our technical assistance activities and training programs, please
visit our website at http://aysps.gsu.edu/isp/index.html or contact us by email at
hseraphin@gsu.edu.

The Impact of Tax Incentives to Stimulate
Investment in South Africa1
Estian Calitz
University of Stellenbosch, South Africa

Sally Wallace
Georgia State University, USA

Le Roux Burrows
University of Stellenbosch, South Africa

1

University of Stellenbosch, South Africa, Georgia State University, USA, and University of Stellenbosch, South
Africa, respectively. The authors thank Niek Schoeman for suggesting the input-output analysis route and Basil
Maseko for inputs and perspectives regarding the nature and magnitude of different tax incentives in South
Africa. The normal disclaimer applies.

2

International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series

Few if any contemporary public economists of note laud the virtue of tax incentives. On the
contrary, the general line is to warn against them. Bird (2008: 9) states as follows: “Despite
their continuing popularity almost everywhere, tax incentives are usually redundant and
ineffective: they reduce and complicate the fiscal system without achieving their stated
objectives. Even to the limited extent that some incentives are effective in inducing investors
to behave differently than they would have done in response to market signals, the result is
often inefficient, diverting scarce resources into less than optimal uses.” Zee, Stotsky and Ley
(2002: 1497) observe that the use of tax incentives is widespread even though the available
empirical evidence on the cost-effectiveness of such incentives in stimulating investment is
highly inconclusive. An FIAS (2001) report on incentives in Indonesia finds little evidence of
success in luring investment via incentives—at least without very high costs.
There is evidence to the contrary as well. Incentives aimed explicitly at increasing foreign
direct investment are used throughout the world. And there is some evidence of their
impact. De Mooij and Ederveen (2003) find that the elasticity of foreign direct capital stock
with respect to changes in the cost of capital is greater than one in developed countries.
Klemm and Van Parys (2009) make a distinction between tax rate differentials and other
incentives and find that the latter have some impact on investment but they do not conclude
that they have a discernable impact on economic growth.
No matter the evidence, tax incentives continue to drive much of the tax policy in developing
and developed countries and there are myriad examples. Competitive tax incentives
between countries in a region are often the order of the day (Keen & Mansour, 2009). For
example: tax incentives are a central part of Rwanda’s economic development plan (UNCTAD
2006; FIAS 2006a); in April 2011 Uganda’s tax exemptions led the IMF to call for their
elimination to broaden tax bases (IMF, 2011); and South Africa has a substantial number of
incentives that reach manufacturing, tourism, and mining among other industries (FIAS,
2006b; IMF, 2008; Deloitte, 2009). Even within countries, such as the U.S., states
(subnational governments) find themselves “at war” with one another over the attraction of
businesses through incentives (for a practical example, see Wisconsin Legislative Reference
Bureau, 2006).
While the impact of tax incentives on economic growth has been the focus of a large amount
of theoretical and empirical research in developed nations, the question of their impact
remains elusive. In developing nations, the empirical evidence of the impact of tax incentives
is growing but the answers are at least as, if not more, elusive. The dearth of evidence is
particularly troublesome when these countries experiment with a wide variety of incentives.
What are the goals of these incentives? Are these incentives effective? Are there
distributional implications of incentives that may be counterproductive or enhance first
round impacts? What is the cost-benefit associated with their use? How can we evaluate
them?
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The purpose of this paper is, very generally, to provide a framework and potential
methodology of analysis of tax incentives in one country — South Africa. As incentives are
often specific and targeted, the precise methods needed to analyze the effectiveness of
incentives may well differ among types of incentives. However, by positing a framework for
evaluation based on basic economic principles, we believe that transparency, accountability
and rigorous evaluation of individual incentives or regarding the choice of incentives may be
enhanced.
We choose the case of South Africa as one where tax incentives have been widely used and
for which data are more readily available than in many other sub-Saharan African countries.
Our focus is on developing a reasonable way to identify and classify incentives so as to
reduce the apples-to-oranges comparison syndrome (which may provide cover for a lack of
analysis), positing a hierarchy of incentives based on their likely efficiency enhancing (or
efficiency diminishing) properties, and providing a means to evaluate the potential
macroeconomic effectiveness of these policies up front, which also provides a means to
evaluate the policies ex post. The importance of establishing evidence for policies such as tax
incentives cannot be overstated – too often policies march forward with little consideration
of the cost-benefit and opportunity cost of specific policy interventions. Using known tools
including Input-Output (Supply-Use) tables and analysis, Social Accounting Matrices, and
resulting multipliers and relying on previous research, we provide a framework to compare
alternative incentives ex ante. These tools are also used in computable general equilibrium
models, but we suggest that full blown CGE models may not be the most transparent tool to
evaluate the subtleties of targeted tax incentives, which many countries use. CGE models are
becoming increasingly detailed and disaggregated, but often do not incorporate the sector
specificity found in I-O models.
Section 1 raises definitional issues and summarizes economic effects of a variety of tax
incentives. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the literature. In Section 3 a classification is
presented of tax incentives as instruments to promote direct fixed investment, with
reference to differences of acceptability and incidence in South Africa. In Section 4 we
estimate the effect of tax incentives, and section 5 considers alternatives to tax incentives.
Section 6 concludes.
1. Economics of Tax Incentives
Tax incentives come in many forms. Incentives may relieve tax liabilities completely (tax
holidays), partially, provide preferred rates, deductions, exemptions and may fall on one tax
or many. Incentives are given by central governments as well as subnational governments.
Incentives may be very localized with the expectation of generating investment in one region
of a country or may be developed with the expectation of increasing investment (foreign and
domestic) at large. In section 3 below, we present a means of categorizing incentives.
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Whatever the form of tax incentive, the economics are relatively straightforward. In the case
of incentives focused on investment (many of the incentives employed through the
corporate income tax or taxes on capital income), the user cost of capital concept (UCC) (the
price of capital) demonstrates that tax incentives may work to reduce the cost of capital
directly or indirectly, thereby increasing investment. The precise definition of the UCC is
affected by the level of detail, but a basic construct is that found in Hall and Jorgensen
(1967):
q = purchase price of 1 unit of K
δ = proportionate depreciation rate of K
q*δ = depreciation in one period for K worth q per unit
r = cost of financing per dollar of financing
q*r = cost of financing per unit of K
-Δq = change in value of capital (loss)
UCC = q (r + δ – g) where g = Δq /q
Profits are maximized when capital is hired to the point that the value of the marginal
product of capital (P*MPk) is equal to the user cost. Factors such as tax rates, depreciation
and treatment of capital gains, tax holidays, and subsidized interest rates affect the UCC and
thereby the level of investment. A similar model might be derived for labor which
demonstrates that tax incentives aimed at reducing the cost of labor would potentially
increase hiring.
Other incentives could reduce other variable costs such as transportation, thus reducing the
marginal cost of production. Again, under such a scenario, a profit maximizing firm would
then be able to increase the amount of output. Some incentives reduce fixed costs including
the costs of doing business (licensing, permitting, making tax payments, etc.). A reduction of
these costs may reduce the threshold for new firms entering and thereby expand investment
and production.
These stylized models are admittedly simple, but demonstrate the potential impact of tax
incentives and the notion that they can be modeled within a relatively standard market
framework. In the “real world” complications arise due to competing policies, substitutability
between capital and other inputs, impact of long-term incentives, competition from other
countries, etc. Besides, the economic incidence differs from the statutory incidence. These
complications can mitigate or exacerbate the impact of incentives in any one country.
We submit that, if the incentive is substantial, a computable general equilibrium (CGE)
approach may be used to analyze the potential impact. There is no golden rule regarding
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when a CGE model is an appropriate tool of analysis, but many tax incentives are small
relative to the size of the economy and in many cases, CGE models will not include detailed
sectors and or administrative detail to deal with specific incentives. This is not true in the
case of broad incentives including a reduction in the corporate income tax.
Many countries target tax incentives to a specific industry as a means to develop new
industries or revive older industries. As a result, in the short run, the UCC in one industry
may be heavily subsidized by tax increases in other industries (or on other factors), creating
a competitive advantage in the short run. Depending on the mobility of factors of
production, we would expect that the net rates of return to all factors would eventually
equilibrate or tend to converge. As a result, the competitive advantage of the original
incentive may be mitigated (or enhanced) depending on the structure of the economy,
factor mobility and substitution and the like, a la Harberger’s general equilibrium corporate
tax incidence analysis.
2. Views on tax incentives
We distinguish between general and selective investment tax incentives. General tax
incentives refer to incentives applying across the board, and with no exception, to all tax
payers, such as a reduction in the corporate tax rate or universal depreciation allowances.
Selective investment tax incentives is defined as a selective deviation from the benchmark
tax, i.e. the standard tax provision as legislated and which is suspended or changed to
benefit a select group of taxpayers. Along with Zee, Stotsky and Ley (2002: 1498) we
distinguish, with reference to investment, between a statutory and an economic tax
incentive. The former is defined as “a special tax provision granted to qualified investment
projects (however determined) that represents a statutorily favorable deviation from a
corresponding provision applicable to investment projects in general (i.e. projects that
receive no special tax provision).” The latter is defined as “a special tax provision granted to
qualified investment projects that has the effect of lowering the effective tax burden –
measured in some way – on those projects, relative to the effective tax burden that would
be borne by the investors in the absence of the special tax provision.” Together, general and
special tax incentives represent total tax expenditure, although a reduction in corporate tax
rates would not be regarded as a tax expenditure.2 Our focus is on incentives focused on
encouraging investment in the home country. The real impact depends on the economic and
not the statutory incidence of the benefit.
Tax incentives which are directed at business activities are aimed at real investment in
productive activities rather than investment in financial assets and often directed to foreign
investors. They are supposed to supplement insufficient domestic capital for the desired
level of economic development in specific sectors or across the board. The accompanying
modern technology and management techniques are viewed as an important side-benefit,
2

For an outline of definitional issues, see OECD (2010).
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and in some instances technology transfer is a key objective of incentives (United Nations,
2000) – the positive externality argument. Developing and transition countries have
introduced investment incentives for varying reasons. In some cases, especially in transition
countries that have not reformed the socialist tax system, incentives were seen as
counterweight to investment disincentives inherent in the general tax system. In other
countries, they have been introduced to offset other disadvantages investors may face, e.g.
lack of infrastructure, complicated and antiquated laws, bureaucratic complexities and weak
administration in the area of tax or elsewhere. Sometimes they were introduced to keep up
with other countries in competing for international investment, a kind of ‘race to the
bottom’ in effective corporate tax rates. Although tax incentives might be justified as
temporary measures until more deep-seated deficiencies have been removed, there are
countries where such incentives were actually introduced or maintained even after
deficiencies in law and administration had been remedied (Holland & Vann, 1998: 987).
Why are many economists and fiscal authorities at best lukewarm about tax incentives?
These incentives distort preferences and allocative efficiency. They are criticised because
they imply that government officials are better able than private investors to decide the best
types and means of production, which would be necessary if economic performance is to be
improved. This amounts to a criticism of any ‘picking-winners’ industrial strategy. The
criticism is also based on empirical evidence that the investment decision is determined by
more than tax-related considerations, that is, nontax-related economic considerations,
noneconomic considerations and social policy considerations. A first best approach would be
to address impediments at source and not through tax incentives.3 Further, tax incentives
create tax-driven businesses, which are not eventually economically sustainable. In fact, a
vested interest is created in their perpetuation, which makes them very difficult to abolish.
From a fiscal point of view, the real cost is hidden and the tax base is eroded. The growing
call for tax expenditures budgets may be a reflection of the institutionalized nature of tax
incentives and other changes in tax systems over the years.
Often the non-transparent character of incentives facilitates tax evasion, complicates tax
administration and encourages rent-seeking behaviour and corruption. Most incentives do
not reach entities unless profit is made; companies with initial high layout cost do not qualify
unless excess tax credits can be sold to profitable companies (a growing policy option in
some industry incentives in the U.S.). Empirical research indicate that tax incentives can
stimulate investment, but that a country’s overall economic characteristics may be more
important for the success or the failure of industries than any tax incentives package (Zee,

3

Supporters of tax incentives will often forward the argument of incubators for new businesses in which the
barriers to entry are quite high due to technology, information, etc. In some cases, these market-failure
barriers to entry may be mitigated by government supported research and development, regulations on
monopolies, etc. Tax incentives to support specific industries are more of a blunt instrument that may also
benefit other industries. In the end, the question remains – can the new industry be sustained without
additional policy interference?
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Stotsky & Ley, 2001:1509). Even if tax incentives stimulate investment, they are not generally
cost effective.
The limited usefulness of tax incentives derives also from the fact that investors often
emphasize the relative unimportance of the tax system in investment decisions compared
with other considerations (Holland & Vann, 1998: 987). Evidence is that firms first examine a
country’s basic economic and institutional situation and are basically attracted to the
potential markets in developing and transition countries and the relatively low-cost labour.
Factors inhibiting large-scale investment and for which tax incentives can’t compensate
include uncertainty in the policy stance of governments, political instability and the
rudimentary state of the legal framework for a market economy (in transition economies).
Tax incentives on their own cannot overcome these negative factors and the general
features of the tax system (tax base, tax rates, stability, consistency/predictability,
transparency, etc.) are more important than tax incentives. (Klemm & Van Parys, 2009;
James, 2009; McKinsey Global Institute, 2003).
Why do countries enact tax incentives despite their drawbacks? Legislators may feel the
need to do something to attract investment but may find it difficult to address the chief
reasons that discourage investment. Tax incentives are at least something over which they
have control and which they can enact relatively easily and quickly, precisely because the full
cost is not always visible or disclosed. Alternatives to tax incentives may also involve direct
expenditure of funds, and tax incentives may be seen as a politically easier alternative, since
subsidies involving direct expenditure may undergo closer scrutiny than tax expenditures
aimed at attracting investment. In fact, few countries produce a regular tax expenditure
budget that quantifies the value of incentives while direct expenditures are under scrutiny in
any modern budgeting exercise. In addition, some countries may feel under pressure to
provide “visible” incentives for multinational companies, who threaten to locate investment
elsewhere if they are not given concessions. Incentives also provide a popular way for
officials to show efforts to increase employment and incubate or otherwise support
industries deemed important to the country.
Many economists would admit, however, if pushed, that a market-failure case can be made
for tax incentives to internalize positive externalities in a Pigouvian way. Examples are in
respect of: projects located in less developed regions of a country (either to reduce
congestion and/or pollution in the developed regions, or to reduce the disparity in income
distribution that could be viewed as having some public-good characteristics); projects
entailing use of advanced technologies that could raise the general technological absorption
capacity of a country; projects that have a high propensity of leading to a build-up of key
types of human capital whose benefits usually extend beyond the persons embodying them;
and projects that involve research and development activities in targeted areas deemed
important for whatever policy reasons. (see Zee, Stotsky & Ley, 2002: 1500).
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3. Classification of tax incentives, with reference to South Africa
In South Africa interest in tax expenditure (of which tax incentives form a subset) has flared
up from time to time. Heyns (1984) listed 164 tax expenditures and the cost of some, arguing
the case for a tax expenditure budget for South Africa. The Margo Commission (RSA, 1988:
67-68) recommended the phasing out of various tax expenditures, some of which were
indeed terminated even if with some delay (like the phasing out of the general export
incentive scheme). The IMF’s (2008) Country Report on South Africa presents a
comprehensive list of tax expenditures. The first time an official list of tax expenditures was
published, was in the 2011 Budget Review (RSA, 2011: 181). South Africa has yet to publish a
fully-fledged tax expenditure budget, however, and little – if any – aggregate analysis has
been done on the impact of tax incentives.4
Drawing on Zee, Stotsky and Ley (2002: 1502-1507), Table 1 contains a codified list of
different types of tax incentives, as well as a brief statement regarding the acceptability (or
unacceptability) of the different types of tax incentives from the point of view of allocative
or tax efficiency and/or administrative feasibility.5 A tick (⥌) in the second column indicates
that this type of incentive is currently applied in South Africa.
Analysis of tax incentives should reflect an absolute analysis (is the incentive “good”?) as
well as a relative analysis (is incentive X better than incentive Y?). The normative analysis of
tax incentives consists of concerns over economic efficiency and equity. The welfare cost of
incentives should be considered when contemplating and comparing incentives. Similarly,
the equity implications are to be taken into account but may be difficult to do so. Tax
incentives by their nature are revenue losers and should be offset with an increase in other
revenue or a decrease in expenditures, unless of course the intent is to stealthily increase
TABLE 1. TYPES OF TAX INCENTIVES
Incentive type and
Statement on acceptability
use in SA
Direct tax incentives
1.
Corporate income tax (CIT) rate incentives
1.1 Tax holidays
 Bulk of revenue forgone is likely to have no beneficial impact
on investment. Benefit-cost ratio is low.
 Particularly susceptible to tax planning (i.e. avoidance
schemes), including fictitious foreign-owned companies.
 Not recommendable.
1.2 Preferential CIT
 Rules are complex and subject to manipulation.
rates
 Identifying the qualifying income is problematic. Income
⥌
from both existing and new operations becomes eligible. It is
less likely to be cost-effective than incentives related to the
4

Category
code
CITR
CITR-TH

CITR-PR

There has been some analysis of the effectiveness of particular tax incentives, however, such as Flatters (2002)
in respect of the motor industrial development programme (MIDP).
5
When economists qua economists do not succeed in stemming the tide and dampening the political affinity for
tax incentives, they still have a role to play, namely to advise on which tax incentives are the least unacceptable
in the second- or third-best world. And sometimes they are listened to.
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TABLE 1. TYPES OF TAX INCENTIVES
Incentive type and
use in SA

Category
code

Statement on acceptability

amount of new investment.
 Not recommendable.
2.
Investment cost-recovery incentives
2.1 Investment
 Of greatest benefit to firms with income from existing
allowances
operations, who can shelter a portion of their income from
⥌
tax with the incentives earned on the new investment.
 Firms with low income or start-up firms cannot begin to take
advantage of the incentive until investment begins to earn
taxable income.
 Revenue impact in theory tied to the degree of new activity:
relatively small in early years of program and grows over
time as more firms become eligible.
 Carry-forward of deductions by firms that cannot fully use
them can considerably raise the revenue cost over time.
 Meritorious.
2.2 Investment tax
 Can be manipulated, using subsidiary costing, to claim
credits
benefit for inefficient spending or cost (together with
⥌
depreciation allowances) exceeding investment.
3.
Accelerated
 Incentive in form of accelerated depreciation.
depreciation
 Amount written off reduces future depreciation base,
⥌
ensuring total amount written off cannot exceed the actual
investment cost.
 Has fewest of the shortcomings associated with CIT rate
incentives and all of the virtues associated with investment
cost-recovery.
4.
Investment
 Can be in form of income tax relief and/or preferential tax
subsidies
rates on interest, dividends and capital gains
 Least meritorious.
Indirect incentives
5.
Export-oriented
 Very prone to abuse, as qualified purchases can easily be
incentives (tariff or
diverted to buyers not intended to receive the incentives.
VAT exemptions)
 Duty draw-back schemes a better version.
⥌
6.
Export processing
 Tax incentives available in these zones often comprise both
zones
indirect and direct taxes – latter often tend to attract
economic activities unrelated to exports.

ICR
ICR-IA

ICR-ITC

AD

IS

EO

EPZ

the general tax burden. We do not attempt to do a full fiscal incidence analysis at this time
and so we concentrate on the efficiency aspects of the tax incentives.
Incentives may impact welfare, employment, and income over a short or long period. The
longer the payback to an incentive, the lesser will be the net present benefit of that
incentive. An exception might be when the tax incentive is supposed to internalize a social
benefit, such as in the case of new technology, or addressing a structural bias against market
entry (although the first-best solution would be to remove the structural barrier). A central
question then becomes, what is the period of analysis? Incentive schemes are often
designed to generate tax benefits on the basis of performance criteria, such as job creation,
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generation of foreign exchange and decentralisation into particular regions (e.g. relocation
of industry to rural areas to counter urbanisation or for some other politico-economic
reason6). It is difficult to evaluate the efficiency of such types of incentives as one is required
to value allocative efficiency as well as equity.
Table 2 contains an illustrative matrix for South Africa, and includes a list of tax incentives (of
the types indicated in Table 1 with ⥌), a category code and information on the type and
nature of tax to which the incentive is linked, as well as the nature of, reasons for, estimated
cost of the incentive (based here and there on some heroic assumptions, as outlined in
Appendix A), and economic acceptability of the incentive. It should be noted that the
introduction of a tax incentive often adds to the cost of administration. Admittedly, there are
also cases where a tax allowance may well save administrative cost, for example exempting
very small business from income tax.
TABLE 2. TAX INCENTIVES PERTAINING TO MANUFACTURING IN SOUTH AFRICA, 2009
Incentive
Type/
Category
Code
Rebate on
import
duties in
manufacture for
home consumption or
export
EO

Special
small
business
corporation
tax
structure
CITR-PR

6

Reasons for
Incentive

Acceptability of
Incentive

Other comments /
assessment(s)

Partial rebate or a rebate
of the full duty on
certain specified
imported goods

To stimulate
local
manufacture,
to reduce input
cost of locally
manufactured
goods which in
turn allow local
manufacturers
to be more
competitive in
international
trade

Target winners;
duty draw-back
schemes a
better version

Reduced rate of taxation
and special tax regime presumptive tax,
enhanced depreciation
regime, capital gains tax
relief, relief from skills
development levy,
graduated scale:
 Tax threshold: R
59 750
 Taxable income R
59 751 - R300 000:
10% of amount > R
59 750

Reduce the cost
of compliance
for small
businesses and
encourage
expansion of
small
businesses

Differential tax
rates lead to
perverse
incentives to
decompose
larger entities
into smaller
ones; may
encourage nonprofitable small
businesses to
develop

Beneficiaries in
2008/09: light
motor vehicles
(MIDP)
(R 5 635 m);
heavy motor
vehicles (R 942
m); motor vehicle
parts &
accessories
(R 594 m); textile
(R 426 m);
furniture &
fixtures (R 128 m)
 No sunset
clause
 Stern &
Barbour
(2005)
estimated
METR for
SMEs between
22-32%
(corporate
rate then
29%); higher
than standard
tax regime in

Nature of Incentive

Cost
estimate
(08/09),
[2009 R m]
14 241

675

An interesting example is Germany, where tax incentives are offered for industrial development in the area of
the former DDR.
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TABLE 2. TAX INCENTIVES PERTAINING TO MANUFACTURING IN SOUTH AFRICA, 2009
Incentive
Type/
Category
Code

Nature of Incentive

Reasons for
Incentive

Acceptability of
Incentive

 Taxable income ≥R
300 001: R24 025 (plus
28% of amount > R300
000)

Other comments /
assessment(s)

Cost
estimate
(08/09),
[2009 R m]

formal sectors;
16% if
registered for
VAT

Film
allowance
ICR

An incentive for locally
owned productions
filming in South Africa;
allows rebate up to 35%
of qualifying expenditure
on productions of a total
budget ≥ R2.5 million;
R10 m cap

Increase
investment in
development of
new business

Research
and
Developme
nt
Allowance
ICR-ITC

Increased expensing of
assets and recurrent
expenditures
Tax allowance for: (a)
purchase of equipment
and buildings deducted
at 50:30:20% (average
33.3%); (b) current
expenditure deducted at
150%.

Increase
investment in
development of
new
technologies,
production
techniques, etc.

Learnership
Allowance
ICR

Additional deductions
for training

Increase skill of
workforce,
reduce cost of
expanded
training

Strategic
Industrial
Policy
Incentive
ICR
Urban
Developme
nt Zones
ICR-AD

100% deduction for
equipment up to a
treshhold

Increase
investment in
critical areas

Accelerated depreciation
allowed for investments
in qualified zones

Increase
investment in
urban areas of
SA

Can be
manipulated,
using to claim
benefit for
inefficient
spending or
cost (together
with
depreciation
allowances) >
investment; cap
contains risk
R&D credits can
reduce
entrepreneurial
risk and
encourage
innovation and
growth; difficult
to monitor R&D
investments
relative to
regular costs
Providing
training via the
tax system
could lead to
evasion; more
acceptable if in
form of
expenditure
subsidy
Targets
winners—
critical
investment
areas;
Long-term
effectiveness?
Picking winners

 Number of
beneficiaries
have dropped
from peak of
67 in 2003/04
to 7 in
2008/09

319

 No sunset
clause
 In 2008/09
2 015
companies
benefitted,
down from the
2006/07 peak
of 3 087

219

193

61

85
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TABLE 2. TAX INCENTIVES PERTAINING TO MANUFACTURING IN SOUTH AFRICA, 2009
Incentive
Type/
Category
Code
TOTAL

Nature of Incentive

Reasons for
Incentive

Acceptability of
Incentive

Other comments /
assessment(s)

Cost
estimate
(08/09),
[2009 R m]
15 792

In the remainder of this paper, we focus on those incentives aimed at increasing investment,
employment and output and those that are employed through the corporate income tax
system in South Africa. There are many additional incentives afforded producers and
consumers through various taxes. The South African National Treasury (RSA, 2011: 189-192)
produces an estimate of tax expenditures (including explicit tax incentives as well as more
implicit tax reductions), which help to understand the nature and magnitude of the many
incentives in the country. These incentives form part of a bigger group of incentives
containing many expenditure subsidies designed to benefit particular sectors of the
economy in one way or another.
4. Analysis of the impacts of tax incentives
Many incentives are focused on increasing investment and employment and many
specifically target the UCC in particular industries. Given the link between incentives and the
UCC (and wages), one might argue that the first line of evaluation of a large group of
incentives is to calculate the impact of incentives on the effective marginal tax rate on
factors of production (METR). The METR measures the difference between net and gross
rate of return due to specifics of tax policies within a country.7 A larger decrease in the METR
would be expected to bring greater economic activity. A time series (or cross section)
analysis of investment or employment as a function of the METR could be a useful incentive
evaluation tool ex ante, estimated METRs under various incentives could be a useful way to
inform the process of determining the “best” incentive.
METRs are notoriously difficult to calculate as they should reflect very specific tax treatment
of capital, including depreciation, carry forward/back of losses, and treatment of capital
gains. Calculating METRs over time (or across countries) is that much more difficult due to
changes in tax laws, regulations that affect “doing business”, etc. Incentives also often focus
on a subset of industries (or regions) and attributing a net change in the price of capital as a
result is somewhat subjective.
As a result of these complications, there are few if any analyses of tax incentives that take
this micro approach of measuring the impact of tax incentives on macro aggregates (growth,

7

Regulatory policies may also be considered. METR analysis is derived from a standard model of profit
maximization where the marginal investment is made such that the returns equal costs at the margin.
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employment, etc.) using METRs.8 Such an analysis might be done ex post by regressing
changes in macro aggregates such as employment, GDP, or investment against changes in
the pre and post incentive METR over time. Alternatively, cross sectional analysis may make
use of variation in METRs (overall or by sector) across countries as a determinant of growth
in the same macro aggregates. This type of analysis would tend to be retrospective, although
past experiences could be used to inform future planned incentives. Moreover, as pointed
out by Klem and van Parys (2010: 3), a shortcoming is that METRs do not provide evidence
on actual investment outcomes. An alternative would be to focus on growth, employment,
etc. by sector over time, using the incentive as a “natural experiment.” The problem with
both the above-mentioned econometric techniques is that many incentives are small relative
to overall GDP, employment, etc. and therefore marginal effects associated with incentives
can be difficult to pick up in a time series analysis. Very targeted incentives such as
investment in certain regions of the country and in certain industries may simply be
monitored with local data on employment and output.
There are at least two alternative approaches that might be used to help evaluate the
relative impact of incentives. If governments’ primary goal of incentives is to increase
output, employment and growth, the most useful analysis of incentives is an ex ante one
that compares the potential impacts of incentive X over incentive Y. Of course, such an
analysis should also include a relative measure of acceptability – a “do the least harm” sort
of approach to tax incentives. In support of this type of analysis, a simple social accounting
matrix (SAM) or input-output multiplier analysis could be very effective in guiding
government to the most cost-effective incentive. For want of a better label, we will refer to
these as SAM analyses.9
A SAM analysis provides insight into the following issues: per one rand of tax expenditure on
a particular tax incentive, what is the potential payback country-wide? What industries are
likely to be impacted by way of the multiplier? If the same incentive were considered for two
different industries but could only be given to one industry, which would be more
expansionary?
8

There are however, a number of studies that estimate the METR at a point in time. For example, the FIAS
studies for Zambia and Rwanda report METRs for those countries and also for South Africa, Malawi, Tanzania,
Zimbabwe, Kenya and Uganda. These FIAS reports include METRs by major industries.
9
A SAM is different from an input–output matrix because it not only traces the income and expenditure flows
of activities and commodities, but it also contains complete information on different institutional accounts,
such as households and the government. SAM multipliers are an extension of the classic Leontief input-output
model. While the Leontief model concentrates on inter-industry production linkages, SAM-based models also
include consumption linkages. Consumption linkages are included by making institutions like households and
the government “endogenous.” The SAM multiplier approach therefore makes use of information on
household factor endowments and income distribution. SAM multiplier models have been used for a wide
range of issues from trade policies and macroeconomic shocks to farm-nonfarm linkages. The SAM multiplier
framework can be used to estimate the impacts of changes in any of the exogenous demand accounts in the
model. Because we are treating households as endogenous in the model, this leaves three possible sources of
demand stimulus: export demand, government spending, and investment demand. Exogenous changes in
demand for these accounts are then transmitted to endogenous accounts, including producing sectors and
households. In general SAM multipliers are larger than I-O or Supply-Use multipliers.
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The SAM analysis is by no means clear-cut. First, an assumption would need to be made
regarding the impact of the incentive on the target industry. For example, if accelerated
depreciation in the manufacturing sector reduced the cost of capital by 25 percent, what is
the impact on output? A standard production function could be used to estimate the
elasticity of output with respect to those input prices. Once that estimate is made, the SAM
entry for manufacturing output could be inflated to reflect the new induced level of output.
In a standard multiplier framework, this increase will require increased inputs from a variety
of industries, which can be determined from an I-O model. An example follows. Based on
data from the 2008 SAM 10 (Quantec Research, 2010), the motor vehicles, parts and
accessories industry utilizes inputs from 35 industries of the 41 basic industries in our
analysis. For example, this industry utilizes R 755 m of agriculture, forestry and fishing
output, R 13 m from coal mining and R 2 601 m from other mining, among other industries.
In total, it uses R 135 747 m to produce a total level of output for the industry of
R 292 565 m. Compare this to another type of manufacturing—professional and scientific
equipment, which utilizes inputs from 27 industries. This industry uses R 4 943 m of inputs
from other industries to produce output of R 11 583 m.
If the inputs were of similar relative magnitude, a one rand increase in motor vehicles, parts
and accessories output coming from a tax incentive would be estimated to have a larger
impact than a one rand increase in output of the professional and scientific equipment
industry. This analysis does not weigh government goals such as protecting ‘home industries’
or the redistribution (among workers or regions of the country) that may be implicit when
focusing incentives on one industry over another. The SAM analysis simply shows the
potential difference in relative magnitude of various tax incentives. This analysis is therefore
quite relevant to the policy discussion surrounding tax incentives. Ex post this analysis
provides a metric for analyzing the outcomes of incentives, measured carefully by industry as
the change in the level of output (and employment, which can be analyzed with a full I-O
model analysis).
One might also look to the impact of incentives on potential levels of output using multiplier
analysis, which is in part developed from the SAM. The basic Leontief multipliers categorize
the increased output in connected industries for an increase in output of any one industry.
Using the relationships implicit in the SAM, the multipliers allow estimates of the increased
economic activity across sectors that provide the input supplies to the sector in question. Ex
ante, it is useful to gauge the potential impact across sectors for an incentive regime that is
focused on one particular sector. The externalities that arise through the multiplier effects
could enhance the value of the incentives or potentially be detrimental in extreme cases
where competing industries are needed to supply the subsidized industry.

10

Given that the latest SAM published by Statssa is for the year 2005 it was decided to use the Quantec
Research SAM updated annually. The latest version is for 2008. Specific detail on the SAM is in Appendix B.
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To engage a multiplier model, one needs to know the impact of a tax incentive on the output
of the targeted industry. The impact is of course a function of the production function as
well as supply and demand of factors of production and demand for the output and the
relative reduction in the cost of capital from the incentive. For this preliminary analysis, we
assume that the tax incentive lowers the cost of capital by 100 percent of the incentive and
under assumptions of perfect competition, lowers the price of output by the share of capital
in the total of capital (consumption of fixed capital) plus labor (from the SAM). For ease of
analysis, we assume that the change in the level of output is equal to the change in the price
(using total value of output from the SAM as our baseline). Any of these assumptions may be
changed or made more specific to the industry. This analysis is explained in the examples
below.
Based on our analysis of current incentives in South Africa (Table 3)11, we find that the
incentives are aimed at nine general sectors as follows (with amounts in R million):
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

11

Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing
Mining and quarrying:
Manufacturing:
Electricity, gas and water supply:
Construction:
Wholesale/retail trade, repairs, hotels and restaurants:
Transport, storage and communication:
Financial:
Community, social and personal services:

20.39
13.24
14,687.84
16.67
89.89
266.82
59.85
312.02
59.95

In Table 3 the listed sub-sectors were selected so as to approximate the sectors contained in the I-O table.
Comments in brackets in the first column provide further information on the relationship between the standard
industrial classification used in Table 3 and the sectors in the I-O table.
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TABLE 3. ALLOCATION OF TAX SUBSIDIES IN SOUTH AFRICA BY ECONOMIC SECTOR, 2008/09, R MILLION

TYPE OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY(1)

SIC
CODE

MAJOR DIVISION 1: AGRICULTURE, HUNTING,
FORESTRY AND FISHING
Agriculture, hunting and related
11
services
Commercial cereal crops
111
Commercial other crops
111
112Commercial animal products
114
Fishing
13
MAJOR DIVISION 2: MINING AND QUARRYING
Mining
21-25
MAJOR DIVISION 3: MANUFACTURING
Manufacture of food products,
30
beverages and tobacco products
Production, processing and
preservation of meat, fish, fruit,
301
vegetables, oils and fats
Meat processing
3011
Fish processing
3012
Manufacture of grain mill products,
starches and starch products and
303
prepared animal feeds
Grain milling
3031
Manufacture of beverages and other
304food products
305
Beverages and other food processing
Manufacture of textiles, clothing and
31
leather goods
311Textiles
312
Manufacture of wood and of products
of wood and cork, except furniture;
32
etc
Manufacture of wood and products of
wood, except furniture; etc. (This
321covers the “wood” part of “Wood,
322
Furniture, Misc”)
Manufacture of paper and paper
products (This covers the “paper” part
323
of “Paper, printing”)
Publishing
324
Printing and service activities related to
printing (This, together with
325
“publishing” covers the “printing” part
of “Paper, printing”)
Manufacture of coke, refined
petroleum products and nuclear fuel;
manufacture of chemicals and
33
chemical products; manufacture of
rubber and plastic products
Petroleum refineries/synthesisers
332
(Petroleum products)
334,33
Chemicals & rubber
5,337
Manufacture of other non-metallic
34
mineral products

REBATE ON
IMPORT
SPECIAL
RESEARCH
STRATEGIC
DUTIES IN
SMALL
FILM
AND
INDUSURBAN
MANUFAC- BUSINESS
LEARNERALLOW- DEVELOPTRIAL
DEVELOPTURE FOR
CORPORASHIP ALLOWANCE(3)
MENT
POLICY
MENT
HOME
TION TAX
ANCE(5)
ALLOWINCENZONES(7)
(
CONSUMP- STRUCTURE
ANCE(4)
TIVE(6)
2)
TION OR
EXPORT(1)
R million
6.45

13.94

7.43

5.81

98.23

2 024

219

34.69

61

33.92
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TABLE 3. ALLOCATION OF TAX SUBSIDIES IN SOUTH AFRICA BY ECONOMIC SECTOR, 2008/09, R MILLION

TYPE OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY(1)

Non-metallic mineral prod
Manufacture of basic metals,
fabricated metal products, machinery
and equipment and of office,
accounting and computing machinery
Basic Metals
Manufacture of fabricated metal
products (354 and 355)
Manufacture of machinery and
equipment n.e.c
(The two categories above cover “Fabr
metals, Machinery”)
Manufacture of electrical machinery
and apparatus n.e.c.
Manufacture of radio, television and
communication equipment and
apparatus and of medical, precision
and optical instruments, watches and
clocks
Manufacture of transport equipment
Manufacture of furniture;
manufacturing n.e.c.; recycling
Manufacture of light and heavy motor
vehicles; parts and accessories [Not
explicitly listed in I-O]
Manufacture of furniture (This covers
the “furniture” part of “Wood,
Furniture, Misc”)
MAJOR DIVISION 4: ELECTRICITY, GAS AND
WATER SUPPLY
Electricity, gas, steam and hot water
supply
Production, collection and distribution
of electricity (Electricity)
Collection, purification and distribution
of water (Water)
MAJOR DIVISION 5: CONSTRUCTION
Construction

SIC
CODE

REBATE ON
IMPORT
SPECIAL
RESEARCH
STRATEGIC
DUTIES IN
SMALL
FILM
AND
INDUSURBAN
MANUFAC- BUSINESS
LEARNERALLOW- DEVELOPTRIAL
DEVELOPTURE FOR
CORPORASHIP ALLOWANCE(3)
MENT
POLICY
MENT
HOME
TION TAX
ANCE(5)
ALLOWINCENZONES(7)
(
CONSUMP- STRUCTURE
ANCE(4)
TIVE(6)
2)
TION OR
EXPORT(1)
R million

321342
35
351353
354355
356358

36

37

38
39
381383

12089

391

128
0.25

1.66

15.06

14.26

19.4

3.23

199.67

55.07

12.08

26.11

13.03

20.71

41
411
42

50

MAJOR DIVISION 6: WHOLESALE AND RETAIL
TRADE; REPAIR OF MOTOR VEHICLES, MOTOR
CYCLES AND PERSONAL AND HOUSEHOLD
GOODS; HOTELS AND RESTAURANTS
Trade; repairs
61-63
Hotels and restaurants
64
MAJOR DIVISION 7: TRANSPORT, STORAGE AND
COMMUNICATION
Transport
71-74
Post and telecommunications
75
(Communication)
MAJOR DIVISION 8: FINANCIAL
INTERMEDIATION, INSURANCE, REAL ESTATE
AND BUSINESS SERVICES
Finance and insurance
81-83

319
282.93

29.09
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TABLE 3. ALLOCATION OF TAX SUBSIDIES IN SOUTH AFRICA BY ECONOMIC SECTOR, 2008/09, R MILLION

TYPE OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY(1)

SIC
CODE

REBATE ON
IMPORT
SPECIAL
RESEARCH
STRATEGIC
DUTIES IN
SMALL
FILM
AND
INDUSURBAN
MANUFAC- BUSINESS
LEARNERALLOW- DEVELOPTRIAL
DEVELOPTURE FOR
CORPORASHIP ALLOWANCE(3)
MENT
POLICY
MENT
HOME
TION TAX
ANCE(5)
ALLOWINCENZONES(7)
(
CONSUMP- STRUCTURE
ANCE(4)
TIVE(6)
2)
TION OR
EXPORT(1)
R million

Real estate, own

84
85,86,
MktRealEst + Business services
88
MAJOR DIVISION 9: COMMUNITY, SOCIAL AND
20.29
PERSONAL SERVICES
Other private services
94
39.66
Government services
91-93
uncert
Direct purchases abroad by residents
ain
TOTAL VALUE OF INCENTIVE
14 241
674.99
319
219
192.98
61
85
Source of data: Derived from National Treasury (2011: 181), based on assumptions about sector incidence of tax incentives as explained in
notes below.
Notes
(1) The listed sub-sectors were selected so as to approximate the sectors contained in the I-O table. Comments in brackets in the first
column pertain to the relationship between the standard industrial classification used in Table 3, the sectors in the I-O table and the
assumed sector incidence of the tax incentives.
(2) The sectoral allocation of the benefit from the small business corporation tax structure was calculated as follows. SMMEs’
contribution to turnover of each sector for 2008 was used to calculate the value of their sectoral contribution. The resulting ratios
were used to allocate SMMEs’ contribution to the net profit before tax and dividends for each sector. The resulting ratios were used to
allocate the 2008/09 tax benefit – as calculated by National Treasury – per sector. Sectoral figures for turnover and net profit were
obtained from StatsSA (2010a): Annual financial statistics, 2009. Statistical release P0021. Available at
http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0021/P00212009.pdf. Accessed 26-07-2011. Tax benefit figures were obtained from
National Treasury (2011: 181).
(3) The benefit from the film incentive has been allocated to “communication”, which forms part of the sector “transport, storage and
telecommunication”. The amount is for 2007/08 (the latest available). Source of data: National Treasury (2011: 181).
(4) It is assumed that the entire research and development allowance benefit accrues to the manufacturing sector.
(5) It is assumed that the learnership allowance accrues to sector proportionately to the number of employees per sector (excluding
government and community services) in the first quarter of 2008. Employment figures from StatsSA (2008)
(6) The Strategic Industrial Projects incentives (12G) allowed a 100% deduction on equipment up to a threshold and apply to
manufacturing.
(7) The tax incentive pertaining to the upgrading of property in urban development zones (mainly office parks, residential and commercial
(shops/shopping centres)) has been allocated to sectors of major presence in these zones and in proportion to their gross fixed capital
formation in 2008.

These sectors do not perfectly co-ordinate with our SAM, so we make an adjustment and
assign the 9 affected sectors to more specific sectors as noted in Table 4 (based on details
for the incentives where we have them). For each of the realigned nine sectors, we report
the total value of incentives afforded the sector, the ratio of capital/(capital plus labor) and
the change in the price of output (incentive * (K/K+L)). We assume that the change in output
is equal to the change in price. We run this “shock” or increase in demand (by sector)
through the multiplier model12 to determine the net impact on output of all industries (the
targeted industry as well as the suppliers) and list that in the fifth column of Table 4. The
final column of Table 4 reports the ratio: net impact/incentive. A value greater than one
represents a net benefit over the cost of the incentive.
12

See Breisinger, Clemens, Thomas and Thurlow (2010) for a detailed description on the calculation of SAM
multipliers.
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Table 4: Multiplier analysis of current tax incentives in South Africa

Sector

Total
incentives
Rm

(K/K+L)

Change in
output

Net effect
(change in
output over
all industries
due to
multiplier)(1)
Rm

Impact/
incentive

Agriculture,
forestry, fishing

20.39

0.32240833

6.57390584

22.54756469

1.105814845

Other mining

13.24 0.309260663

4.09461118

9.719302275

0.734086275

14 687.84 0.385272239 5658.817004

15715.4299

1.069961948

Electricity, gas,
steam

16.67 0.423091946 7.052942739

24.46867458

1.46782691

Building
construction

89.89 0.129675936 11.65656993

44.45539092

0.494553242

266.82 0.160463053 42.81475187

155.5968081

0.583152718

59.85 0.385507329 23.07261364

66.01533789

1.103013164

69.16452791

241.4649335

0.773876461

59.95 0.046618379 2.794771795

9.747110226

0.162587327

Motor vehicles,
parts, accessories

Wholesale trade
Transport, storage
Finance and
insurance
Community, social
and personal
services

312.02

0.22166697

Note: (1) The government sector, savings and investment as well as the rest of the world are exogenous to the
model.

While these estimates are relatively crude regarding the price and output effects, they
illustrate the differences in incentives across sectors. The net impact to incentive ratios are
large for incentives aimed at the agriculture, motor vehicles, electricity and transport sectors
and relatively small impacts for trade, mining, finance and community services. These results
come from the number and magnitude of the interactions among industries. If the
government’s objective is to increase total output (and employment), this analysis provides
some evidence that the impacts are very different depending on the incentivized industry.
The limitations of SAM and multiplier analyses are well known. The increase in output is not
countered by any resource constraints. In these models, additional inputs will be found,
additional output will be consumed (implicitly). The relationships among industries are fixed
– doubling the output of industry X will necessitate doubling the input from supporting
industry Y. There are no economies of scale. The implicit production function for output is
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the same across industries. We have made heroic assumptions regarding the impact of
incentives on output to operationalize these models. For relatively small incentives, these
limitations may be acceptable given the benefit of comparing “apples to apples” impacts of a
set of incentives. At this stage, the SAM and multiplier analyses simply show the potential
difference in relative magnitude of various tax incentives. These analyses are therefore quite
relevant to the policy discussion surrounding tax incentives. Ex post these analyses provide a
metric for analyzing the outcomes of incentives, measured carefully by industry as the
change in the level of output (and employment, which can be analyzed with a full I-O model
analysis).
An alternative analytic approach to analyzing tax incentives is a computable general
equilibrium model. A CGE model allows analysis of changes in tax rates to affect
consumption and production while respecting assumed resource constraints. Many CGE
models are not disaggregated enough to analyze relative small changes like tax incentives
that reduce the UCC for particular industries and the complicated relationships within the
model make it difficult to analyze relatively small changes. Such changes get “lost” in
recalibration and may introduce non-convexities that result in non-convergence of new
equilibrium positions. CGE models are very helpful for understanding the relative impact of
large-scale “macro” tax incentives such as a change in the corporate tax rate, elimination of
all exemptions, etc.
Additional analyses could be done to consider the distributional implications of tax
incentives – who wins and who loses? The “cost” of the tax incentive in the short run is a
matter of debate. If a government operated under a balanced budget of sorts, the tax
incentive would have to be financed through higher other taxes (perhaps general funds) or
via lower expenditures. The resulting net fiscal burden could be regressive or progressive. It
would also be useful to analyze the subsidy side of the incentives game. The same tools of
public finance can be used to demonstrate the effectiveness, efficiency and equity of using
direct subsidies (versus tax expenditures) to incentivize particular industries. In some
countries, expenditure subsidies may be more politically acceptable in that they are seen as
a short-term expenditure that can be eliminated in the future. Subsidies should also reach
the regular expenditure budget of governments and thereby be more transparent than tax
incentives.
5. Alternatives
What are the alternatives to tax incentives? The most common approach is to consider the
corporate tax reduction which an abolishment of all investment tax incentives would make
possible. This macro tax incentive could be analyzed and compared to, for example, the cost
of those listed in Table 3. A wide-scale measure such as reduction in the corporate income
tax rate is difficult to analyze without a full CGE approach. However, using a very similar
approach to that of the multiplier analysis above, we can offer some intuition regarding the
potential impact of a general corporate tax reduction. We cannot at this stage say anything
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about the welfare or distributional effects of a general tax reduction versus specific tax
incentives.
Using our multiplier model, we assume once again that a decrease in the corporate tax rate
will reduce the user cost of capital in line with capital’s share of factor inputs in each sector.
Using the same methodology as above, we impose a corporate tax reduction “shock” equal
to the total value of incentives investigated in Table 4 (R 15 526.7 million). We allocated a
share to each sector based on the output of the sector as a share of total output according
to the SAM we use. We use sectors 1-42 in our matrix. The impact of such a change induced
by an overall corporate tax decrease is an increase in output of R 56 017 million—which
yields a benefit (net increase in output) to cost (total cost of incentive) of 3.6. This is much
larger than any of the targeted incentives listed above. We understand that not all sectors
would actually benefit from a corporate tax reduction (those in the non-profit sector or
industries with large numbers of small and start-up companies)—however, the overall
magnitude of impact from a general corporate tax reduction certainly seems to warrant
more attention as a potential replacement for the piecemeal approach of targeted
incentives.
Another approach to analysis of tax incentives is to consider the opportunity cost of tax
incentives with reference to other government programmes which could be financed,
particularly of a pro-poor nature.
Another alternative to tax incentives is cooperation among countries. Such cooperation is
notoriously difficult but interest in cooperation has grown as competition has become more
and more fierce. Cooperation can be of many forms.
It is also possible for countries to address the incentive issue through a general
rationalization of tax systems. If the tax expenditures associated with tax incentives were
used to provide across-the-board reductions in tax rates, countries may be able to effectively
and rationally attract investment. In such cases, the market would ‘pick the winners’ instead
of government. Of course this leaves out targeted incentives where government wants to
pick winners. In addition, countries could engage in more rigorous enforcement of rational
transfer pricing, tax shelter laws and regulations, etc.
6. Conclusion
Tax expenditures are likely to continue to be part of development policy in South Africa and
around the world. There is mixed evidence of the impact of targeted incentives. In this
paper, we attempt to shed more light on how we might evaluate tax incentives to assist
policy makers’ decisions regarding particular incentives. We categorize tax incentives by
“type” and provide a context for developing a hierarchy of tax incentives that would be
expected to have more or less economics impacts (“good” and “bad”). We also provide some
early empirical analysis of the potential impacts of various targeted incentives, using data on
incentives that are currently in use in South Africa.
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Specifically, preliminary analysis demonstrates that relatively simple tools such as social
accounting matrices and Leontief multipliers can provide policy makers a means to evaluate
the relative value of incentives with respect to their output effects. With these models, we
provide preliminary evidence of the superior impact of a general tax incentive such as a
reduced corporate tax rate on output. Future research will focus on the development of a
CGE model that can provide more detailed analysis of such a large scale change. We also
plan to evaluate the expected impact of subsidies versus tax incentives in South Africa.
What remains is identifying an ex post evaluation of tax incentives. Using the estimates of
expected changes in output (from the multiplier analysis and in the future from CGE
analysis), we will attempt to estimate before and after output changes.
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APPENDIX A
ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THE CALCULATION OF THE SECTORAL ALLOCATION OF SOUTH
AFRICAN INDUSTRIAL TAX INCENTIVES, 2008/09
Name of
incentive
Rebate on
import duties
in manufacture for home
consumption
or export
Special small
business
corporation
tax structure

Film
allowance

Research and
Development
Allowance

Learnership
Allowance

Nature of Incentive
Partial rebate or a rebate of the full
duty on certain specified imported
goods

Reduced rate of taxation and special
tax regime - presumptive tax,
enhanced depreciation regime, capital
gains tax relief, relief from skills
development levy, graduated scale:
 Tax threshold: R 59 750
 Taxable income R 59 751 - R300 000:
10% of amount > R 59 750
Taxable income ≥R 300 001: R24 025
(plus 28% of amount > R300 000)
An incentive for locally owned
productions filming in South Africa;
allows rebate up to 35% of qualifying
expenditure on productions of a total
budget ≥ R2.5 million; R10 m cap
Increased expensing of assets and
recurrent expenditures
Tax allowance for: (a) purchase of
equipment and buildings deducted at
50:30:20% (average 33.3%); (b) current
expenditure deducted at 150%.
Additional deductions for training to
increase skill of workforce & reduce
cost of expanded training

Strategic
Industrial
Policy
Incentive

100% deduction for equipment up to a
threshold

Urban
Development
Zones

Accelerated depreciation allowed for
investments in qualified zones

Assumptions underlying calculation Cost (08/09),
(1}
of sectoral allocation
[2009 prices]
Entire benefit accrues to
14 241
manufacturing.

In the absence of data on SME tax
benefits per sector, the tax benefit
accruing to SMEs in the
manufacturing sector was assumed
to be proportional to their sectoral
turnover. 2008 data were used to
allocate the 2008/09 tax incentive.
[Data obtained from StatsSA survey
of businesses not registered for
VAT and income tax (StatsSA,
2010a)]
The entire tax benefit was assumed
to accrue to the subsector
“communication”, which is part of
“transport, storage and
telecommunication”.
The entire tax benefit was assumed
to accrue to manufacturing.

675

Benefit assumed accrued to
economic sectors proportional to
number of employees (excluding
government and community
services), using employment data
for the first quarter of 2008.
The entire tax benefit was assumed
to accrue to manufacturing.

193

319

219

61

The benefit was allocated to
85
sectors of major presence in these
zones, in proportion to gross fixed
capital formation in 2008, namely
manufacturing, electricity, gas and
water, construction, trade,
transport and storage.
Note: (1) This column contains assumptions required in order to derive, from published figures (National
Treasury, 2011: 181), an estimate of the portion of incentives attributed to the different economic sectors.
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Appendix B
The 2008 Quantec RSA Social Accounting Matrix
One way of depicting the economy is the well-known circular flow diagram which captures
all transfers and real transactions between sectors and institutions. Productive activities
purchase land, labour and capital inputs from the factor markets, and intermediate inputs
from commodity markets, and use these to produce goods and services. These are
supplemented by imports (M) and then sold through commodity markets to households (C),
the government (G), investors (I), and foreigners (E). In the circular flow diagram, each
institution's expenditure becomes another institution's income. In other words, all income
and expenditure flows are accounted for, and there are no leakages from the system.
A social accounting matrix (SAM) is also a representation of the economy. More specifically,
it is an accounting framework that assigns numbers to the incomes and expenditures in the
circular flow diagram. A SAM is laid out as a square matrix in which each row and column is
called an "account." Figure A1 shows the 2008 Macro SAM of South Africa. Each cell in the
matrix represents, by convention, a flow of funds from a column account to a row account.
For example, the circular flow diagram shows private consumption spending as a flow of
funds from households to commodity markets. In the SAM, it is entered in the household
column and commodity row. The underlying principle of double-entry accounting requires
that, for each account in the SAM, total revenue equals total expenditure. This means that
an account's row and column totals must be equal.
The SAM distinguishes between "activities" and "commodities". Activities are the entities
that produce goods and services, and commodities are those goods and services produced
by activities. They are separated because sometimes an activity produces more than one
kind of commodity (by-products). Similarly, commodities can be produced by more than one
kind of activity. The values in the activity accounts are usually measured in producer prices.
Activities produce goods and services by combining the factors of production with
intermediate inputs. This is shown in the activity column of the SAM, where activities pay
factors the wages, rents and profits they generate during the production process (that is,
value-added). This is a payment from activities to factors, and so the value-added entry in
the SAM appears in the activity column and the factor row. Similarly, intermediate demand
is a payment from activities to commodities. Adding together value-added and intermediate
demand gives gross output. The information on production technologies contained in the
activity column is the input part of a typical "input-output table", or factor and intermediate
inputs per unit of output.
Commodities are either supplied domestically or imported. Indirect sales taxes and import
tariffs are paid on these commodities. This means that the values in the commodity accounts
are measured at market prices. A number of economic entities purchase commodities.
Activities buy commodities to be used as intermediate inputs for production. Final demand
for commodities consists of household consumption spending, government consumption, or
recurrent expenditure, gross capital formation or investment, and export demand. All of
these sources of demand make up the commodity row. On their own, the commodity row
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and column accounts are sometimes referred to as a "supply–use table", or the total supply
of commodities and their different kinds of uses or demands.
The Macro SAM in Figure A1 shows only single activity and commodity rows and columns.
The Macro SAM is disaggregated into 49 activities producing 49 commodities to form the
Micro SAM used in this paper. These categories are: Agriculture, forestry & fishing; Coal
mining; Gold & uranium ore mining ; Other mining; Food; Beverages & tobacco; Textiles;
Wearing apparel; Leather & leather products; Footwear; Wood & wood products; Paper &
paper products; Printing, publishing & recorded media; Coke & refined petroleum products;
Basic chemicals; Other chemicals & man-made fibres; Rubber products; Plastic products;
Glass & glass products; Non-metallic minerals; Basic iron & steel; Basic non-ferrous metals;
Metal products excluding machinery; Machinery & equipment; Electrical machinery;
Television, radio & communication equipment; Professional & scientific equipment; Motor
vehicles, parts & accessories; Other transport equipment; Furniture; Other industries;
Electricity, gas & steam; Water supply; Building construction; Wholesale & retail trade;
Catering & accommodation services; Transport & storage; Communication; Finance &
insurance; Business services; Medical, dental & other health & veterinary services;
Community, social & personal services; Government: General administration; Government:
Defence; Government: Law and order; Government: Education; Government: Health;
Government: Social; Government: Economic.
A SAM is different from an input–output matrix because it not only traces the income and
expenditure flows of activities and commodities, but it also contains complete information
on different institutional accounts, such as households and the government. Households are
usually the ultimate owners of the factors of production, and so they receive the incomes
earned by factors during the production process. They also receive transfer payments from
the government and from the rest of the world. Households then pay taxes directly to the
government and purchase commodities.
The government receives transfer payments from the rest of the world. This is added to all of
the different tax incomes to determine total government revenues. The government uses
these revenues to pay for recurrent consumption spending and transfers to households. The
difference between total revenues and expenditures is the fiscal surplus or deficit.
According to the ex post accounting identity, investment or gross capital formation, which
includes changes in stocks or inventories, must equal total savings. The difference between
total domestic savings and total investment demand is total capital inflows from abroad, or
what is called the current account balance. This is also equal to the difference between
foreign exchange receipts and expenditures.
Labour is disaggregated into four categories: semi- and unskilled, skilled, highly skilled and
informal. Households are disaggregated into 14 categories using percentiles of the income
spectrum. The rest of the world is disaggregated into 12 categories: Africa excluding SADC;
SADC; NAFTA; South and Central America; Europe excluding EU; European Union; Eastern
Asia; South-central Asia; South-Eastern Asia; Western Asia; Oceania and Not allocated.
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Figure A1. Macro SAM(1) for South Africa, 2008, Rm
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